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made on a daily basis, while assessments of firm
support reflect more stable, long-term views about
the company.
The implications for this research are far-
reaching with respect to efforts aimed at increas-
ing employee involvement and participation.
Butts and his colleagues’ findings support the use
of high-involvement work practices, including
increased employee decision-making latitude,
greater access to information and developmental
opportunities, and doing more to link rewards to
performance. That said, to maximize the effective-
ness of such participatory initiatives, organizations
need to consider additional factors such as em-
ployee empowerment. Organizations should em-
power employees through interventions aimed at
increasing employee confidence, the importance
of their work, and the impact they feel they can
have on the job. Doing so may facilitate the
relationship between high-involvement work
practices and positive employee outcomes such as
higher job satisfaction, organizational commit-
ment, and job performance as well as lower stress.
Moreover, as this research shows, employees’
belief that the organization cares for and values
them is also important. Such beliefs can
strengthen any preexisting relationships between
employee empowerment and the positive out-
comes, including increased commitment and low-
ered job-related stress.
Overall, these results underscore that for
high-involvement work practices to be most ef-
fective, firms need to recognize that both for-
mal (e.g., empowerment) and informal (e.g.,
social support) aspects of the organizational en-
vironment play important roles in determining
the extent to which positive outcomes will be
realized. Such positive outcomes can be bene-
ficial for both the organization and employees.
So are high-involvement practices “worth it?”
Absolutely.
Source: Butts, M. M., Vandenberg, R. J., DeJoy, D. M.,
Schaffer, B. S., & Wilson, M. G. (2009). Individual reac-
tions to high involvement work practices: Investigating the
role of empowerment and perceived organizational support.
Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 14, 122–136.
Do Rigid Labor Laws Mean Higher
Unemployment in Developing
Countries?
ResearchBrief by Terence Lau,Associate Professor of
Management,University ofDayton
In 2009, labor unrest in France resulted in thekidnapping and hostage-taking of executives.Other French workers blockaded streets in Paris
and burned piles of rubber tires to protest a plant
closure. Most managers with experience in France
would undoubtedly say that such labor action is
not that unusual and is simply part of doing busi-
ness in that country, as it is in other parts of
continental Europe. Press those managers further
and they might express a desire to relocate man-
ufacturing facilities to the Czech Republic or
Hungary—places where a “more relaxed” labor
law environment is perceived to be better for
business, supposedly resulting in economic growth
and lower unemployment.
The use of “perceived” and “supposedly” might
seem odd, especially since economists have a long
history of studying what impact rigid labor regu-
lations have on employment, wages, investment
strategy, and worker productivity. But the major-
ity of prior research on the impact of labor laws
has focused on developed rather than developing
countries. Indeed, only in the last few years have
researchers turned their attention to the effects of
labor laws in developing countries. In their recent
study, Simeon Djankov and Rita Ramalho (both
of the World Bank) aimed to provide some much-
needed confirmation for what has, up to now,
largely been conjecture about the impact of labor
laws in developing nations. Specifically, Djankov
and Ramalho examined studies conducted in the
past five years to assess the connection between
labor law rigidity and unemployment. Put simply,
they set out to demonstrate that if laws make it
easier and cheaper to hire and fire employees in
developing countries, then the unemployment
rate in those countries should be lower.
In doing so, Djankov and Ramalho found that
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unemployment rates are indeed lower when labor
laws are less rigid. Moreover, labor laws seem to
have differential effects on various groups of work-
ers. For instance, developing countries with rigid
labor laws tend to have bigger informal work sec-
tors as well as higher unemployment rates, partic-
ularly among young workers. Put another way,
“insiders” tend to benefit while “outsiders” suffer.
This research has important implications for de-
veloping countries struggling to strike the right
balance between providing worker protection and
attracting more investment as well as cultivating a
culture of entrepreneurship. Consequently, Djankov
and Ramalho’s results are important to corpo-
rate planners who routinely use labor laws and
unemployment rates in the calculus of invest-
ment strategy.
Djankov and Ramalho took a bifurcated ap-
proach to their study. First, they examined the
results of 30 studies, published in top journals since
2004, that focused on the effects of labor laws in
developing countries. Significantly, they limited
their examination to the law affecting the hiring
and firing of workers. In short, they did not ex-
amine collective relations law, social security law,
or civil rights laws. This limitation is important,
because it allows for a more direct apples-to-apples
comparison of laws across multiple jurisdictions
and focuses the analysis on a type of labor law that
is more likely to be broadly enacted than others.
As part of their study, Djankov and Ramalho
reviewed results of labor laws in India, and con-
firmed suspicions that rigid labor laws result in a
more inflexible labor market. While India as a
whole has enjoyed tremendous economic devel-
opment, a state-by-state analysis shows important
differences. The state of West Bengal, for exam-
ple, enacted rigid employment laws beginning in
1947. Output per capita is now falling at an aver-
age of 1.5% per year (at a time when India’s
overall output per capita is growing by 3.3% per
year). The state of Andhra Pradesh, on the other
hand, adopted a more liberalized set of employ-
ment laws in the same time frame. That state grew
at 6% per year between 1958 and 1992. The
studies suggest that changing the regulations
would have resulted in 1.8 million fewer urban
poor in West Bengal.
Other studies from around the world have
yielded similar results. One study concluded that if
Indonesia had adopted the same level of flexibility
in labor regulation as Finland, Indonesia’s unem-
ployment rate would have been 2.1% lower over-
all and 5.8% lower among younger workers. In
fact, the net effect of rigid labor regulation is so
great that it can negate other efforts by the gov-
ernment to stimulate growth, such as trade liber-
alization. One particularly interesting derivative
of this research examined the effect of rigid labor
laws on the level of entrepreneurial activity in
developing countries, finding that flexible regula-
tion increases the probability that young people
will start new ventures.
In the second part of their study, Djankov and
Ramalho conducted a cross-country correlation
analysis using data from the World Bank and the
World Economic Forum. This effort, while unable
to produce conclusive interpretations, clearly
reinforced their initial assessment of previous
research. Overall, their results all point to the
same conclusion—namely, rigid labor laws tend
to be associated with larger informal sectors and
higher unemployment, especially among younger
workers.
Of course, labor laws can evolve over time.
Before the Great Depression, the employment-at-
will doctrine held sway with lawmakers in the
United States. Yet there has always been a distinct
level of discomfort at the unequal balance of
power in the employer-employee relationship.
That discomfort accelerated in the Great Depres-
sion and resulted in a sea change of regulation,
from workplace safety rules (OSHA) to minimum
wage and maximum working hours. In fact, the
development of modern U.S. labor law can be
viewed as the outcome of a democratic process
whereby citizens make an informed choice about
the way they wish to order their society, including
the worker-employer relationship. This may have
negative effects on unemployment.
Indeed, Djankov and Ramalho acknowledge as
much, noting that in Latin America new laws
aimed at providing more protections to workers
coincided with the restoration of democracy after
years of rule by military dictators. Indeed, as econ-
omies develop, democratic processes may coincide
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with labor law changes that, in essence, result in
less flexible legal regimes, even though efficiency
and total employment would benefit from more
flexibility. Naturally, the opposite is true as well,
with some countries adopting more flexible labor
laws as they develop. If nothing else, this under-
scores the need for more research on how labor
laws—and their effects—evolve over time, partic-
ularly in developing countries.
Source: Djankov, S., & Ramalho, R. (2009). Employment
laws in developing countries. Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics, 37, 3–13.
Founder- and Heir-Controlled Firms: Is





There’s an old saying: “Don’t air your dirty laun-dry in public.” But does that admonition applyto family-controlled firms? Clearly, in privately
owned firms the degree of transparency is some-
thing directly controlled by the founder or family
members. Generally speaking, public firms are
more transparent (or less opaque) than private
firms across a wide range of issues. However, when
family firms become publicly traded, does a pat-
tern of opacity persist? How do these now-public
firms wrestle with the disclosure of information for
minority shareholders and analysts, especially
since in private companies there’s no outside impe-
tus for such transparency? Finally, and perhaps most
important, what is the impact of all of this? For
instance, does the degree of opacity have any effect
on firm performance, and if so, does the type of CEO
(founder, heir, or outsider) somehow play a role?
Underscoring the importance of these ques-
tions is that founders and heirs are often signifi-
cant, undiversified shareholders in public firms.
Indeed, a large percentage of today’s Fortune 500
corporations began as privately held family busi-
nesses and are now publicly traded firms that still
retain a large founder or heir controlling presence
(e.g., Ford Motor Company, Johnson & Johnson).
Moreover, the ability of outside investors and
analysts to monitor controlling shareholders’ oppor-
tunistic behavior is affected by the degree of trans-
parency in a firm. Of course, founders and heirs have
an incentive to collect information and actively
monitor the managers responsible for their often
sizable ownership interests. Yet opacity in a firm may
make it difficult for outside owners and analysts to
assess what founders and heirs are doing in the
process of “monitoring” management. For instance,
one worry is that as controlling owners, founders and
heirs may use opacity to extract value for their own
benefit at the expense of unseeing minority share-
holders in publicly traded firms. On the other hand,
an argument can be made that increased opacity
may help protect a firm’s competitive advantages
from prying eyes.
Naturally, the issues associated with corporate
transparency have been studied for some time. But
relatively little is known about some key questions.
In their well-crafted investigation, Ronald Anderson
(American University), Augustine Duru (American
University), and David Reeb (Temple University)
tested several ideas about corporate transparency in
publicly traded founder- and heir-controlled firms.
In doing so, they created an opacity index (based on
various proxies, including stock trading volume and
analyst forecasting errors) to examine the role of
founder and heir ownership on transparency as well
as the influence of the CEO.
Specifically, Anderson and his colleagues exam-
ined the largest 2,000 U.S. firms from 2001 to 2003
using COMPUSTAT. In their sample, 22% of firms
were founder-controlled firms (founders had an av-
erage equity stake of 18%), while 25% of firms were
heir-controlled (heirs had an average equity stake of
22%). A key goal was to assess the impact of opacity
(e.g., might it promote the ability of founders/heirs
to extract wealth or otherwise undercut firm perfor-
mance?). In addressing this goal, Anderson and his
colleagues were careful to collect data on other di-
rect and indirect control mechanisms (e.g., board
power, dual-class shares, and management positions
available to founders and heirs).
The results showed, after controlling for indus-
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